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INTRODUCTION
It is likely no surprise that attorneys sometimes fail to abide by
the standards of ethical and professional conduct during the course of
litigation. This type of misconduct implicates a federal district court
judge's obligation to maintain order and fairness in her courtroom. In
order to effectuate this duty, the judge has at her disposal a variety of
different tools with which she can admonish or punish an attorney,
including the power to impose monetary sanctions. Nonetheless,
sometimes judges forego explicitly sanctioning an attorney, choosing
instead to express their disapproval of an attorney's behavior by is-
suing an opinion including findings of professional misconduct. These
findings of misconduct can range anywhere from a general observa-
tion regarding an attorney's "lack of professionalism"2 to a more ex-
treme conclusion that an attorney participated in "sanctionable, un-
ethical, vexatious, contemptuous and nearly criminal conduct."3 Given
the potentially significant effects such findings of misconduct could
have on an attorney's professional reputation, attorneys frequently
attempt to appeal in order to expunge the relevant findings.
While it has long been established that nonparty attorneys may
seek appellate review of monetary sanctions,' appeals of orders con-
taining findings of misconduct present a number of more complicated
issues. The various circuits have taken different approaches to appeals
t AB 2006, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2009, The University of Chicago.
1 See Manual for Complex Litigation § 10.154 (Federal Judicial Center 4th ed 2004).
2 Weissman v Quail Lodge Inc, 179 F3d 1194,1196 (9th Cir 1999).
3 Clark Equipment Co v Lift Parts Manufacturing, 1987 WL 19150, *14-15 (ND Ill).
4 See, for example, Retail Flooring Dealers of America, Inc v Beaulieu of America, LLC,
339 F3d 1146, 1147-49 (9th Cir 2003) (discussing the appellate court's jurisdiction to hear the
appeal of a Rule 11 sanction against a nonparty attorney). See also Joan Steinman, Irregulars:
The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full-fledged Parties, 39 Ga L Rev 411, 512 (2005)
(stating generally that attorneys have standing to appeal sanctions entered against them).
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of this nature and have predictably come to three different results:
never appealable, always appealable, and sometimes appealable. Giv-
en the number of different relevant legal doctrines that intersect in
this particular area, the case law demonstrates a great deal of doctrin-
al confusion. Yet despite this complexity, the circuits' disagreements
over this issue boil down to three main disputes: the applicability of
various standing and reviewability doctrines, the appropriateness of
appellate review of nonmonetary sanctions, and the definition of a
sanction.
This Comment addresses each of these disputes in sequence and
resolves them in favor of an approach that expands on the test used by
the Ninth Circuit. This Comment first argues that the issue at hand
does not directly implicate Article III standing requirements. Rather,
it is properly framed by the traditional maxim that courts "review[]
judgments, not statements in opinions."' Under this rule, appellate
review should be extended to all findings of misconduct that qualify as
a sanction regardless of whether the findings are accompanied by
monetary liability. In this context, a sanction should be defined by two
key features, its formality and its capacity to inflict harm. Consistent
with this definition, the Comment proposes a "formality/harm test"
that emphasizes both content and context when assessing which find-
ings of misconduct constitute a sanction. Under this approach, findings
of misconduct originally made in support of later-overturned sanc-
tions would qualify as per se sanctions and therefore would be subject
to appellate review. This rule would be both easy to administer and
effective at achieving a number of important policy goals.
This Comment begins by providing a general background to the
issues relevant to the circuit split in Part I. Then, Part II briefly sum-
marizes the three different positions taken by the various circuits.
Part III assesses the applicability of the "review judgments" rule and
the reviewability of nonmonetary sanctions. Finally, Part IV analyzes
which findings of misconduct qualify as sanctions and introduces the
formality/harm approach.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Judges' Sanctioning Power
District court judges bear the responsibility of assuring that those
involved in the litigation process comport with certain minimum stan-
5 Black v Cutter Laboratories, 351 US 292, 297-98 (1956) (denying an appeal since the
objected-to language was not necessary to the judgment), citing Herb v Pitcairn, 324 US 117,
125-26 (1945).
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dards of conduct. Judges use many different tools to accomplish this
goal, including monetary sanctions, formal reprimands, and punish-
ment for contempt.6 In cases of attorney misconduct in civil litigation,
any valid exercise of a judge's sanctioning power derives its authority
from one of two sources. A sanction may be imposed pursuant to the
judge's inherent power to regulate attorney discipline' or according to
the power granted by a specific Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
The federal courts have an inherent power to monitor the realm
of attorney discipline. This power is implied due to the nature of the
federal judicial institution and the perception that such authority is
necessary to implement successfully other judicial powers When ex-
ercising this power, judges have sought to regulate a wide array of
attorney misconduct and have utilized a number of different discipli-
nary mechanisms. Since this power over attorney discipline is seen as
essential to the integrity of the judicial process, congressional statutes
and rules are assumed not to limit the scope of a court's inherent pow-
ers." In fact, a judge may invoke her inherent powers to sanction cer-
tain bad faith conduct even if that conduct could also be sanctioned
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Despite this power, many federal judges instead decide to employ
the intricate disciplinary scheme set out in the Rules. The Rules in-
clude a number of regulations specifically directed at attorney conduct
and often authorize the use of sanctions to address misbehavior. 2 Par-
6 See Manual for Complex Litigation at § 10.154 (cited in note 1).
7 See Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32. 43-44 (1991) (explaining that the institutional
structure of the federal courts implies a power to regulate attorney misconduct).
8 See, for example, FRCP 11(c) ("[Tlhe court may impose an appropriate sanction on any
attorney, law firm, or party that violated [this Rule] or is responsible for the violation.").
9 See Chambers, 501 US at 43-44 (documenting the deeply rooted history of this well-
established doctrine), citing United States v Hudson, 11 US 32,35 (1812).
10 See Weinberger v Romero-Barcelo, 456 US 305, 313 (1982) ("[W]e do not lightly assume
that Congress has intended to depart from established principles.").
11 See Chambers, 501 US at 49-50 (approving the district court's reliance on its inherent
power to sanction when the sanctionable conduct was made in bad faith and was only partially
covered by the relevant rules and statutes). However, courts ordinarily should rely on the Rules
rather than their inherent power. See id at 50.
12 See FRCP 11 (authorizing sanction of a party and/or her attorney for filing groundless
pleadings, motions, or other papers); FRCP 16(f) (authorizing sanction of a party and/or her attor-
ney for noncompliance with a pretrial order); FRCP 26(g)(3) (authorizing sanction of a party
and/or her attorney for baseless discovery requests or objections); FRCP 30(g) (permitting a judge
to award expenses when a party fails to attend a deposition or to serve a subpoena on a party to be
deposed); FRCP 37(d), (g) (permitting a judge to award expenses when a party fails to respond to
discovery requests or fails to participate in the framing of a discovery plan); FRCP 41(b) (permit-
ting dismissal where a party fails to prosecute or comply with the Rules or an order of the court);
FRCP 45(e) (permitting punishment for failure to obey a subpoena); FRCP 56(g) (permitting a
judge to award expenses and/or contempt damages when a party presents an affidavit in a summary
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ticularly relevant to the discipline at issue in this Comment, Rule 11
specifies that a judicially imposed "sanction" may include both mone-
tary fines and "nonmonetary directives."3 The Advisory Committee
Notes explain that these "nonmonetary directives" may consist of "an
admonition, reprimand, or censure.'"" This broad definition of sanc-
tions immediately raises thorny issues of how to disentangle formal
sanctions from findings of misconduct that might be more appro-
priately categorized as "routine judicial commentary."5
Rule 11 also raises pertinent issues with its requirement that a
judge imposing sanctions "must describe the sanctioned conduct and
explain the basis for the sanction" in an order.'6 This is important since
orders incorporating sanctions frequently include findings of profes-
sional misconduct that underlie the judge's decision to impose sanc-
tions. Hence, if a sanction judgment is later overturned, an order in-
cluding harshly worded findings of misconduct may still remain on the
record. This is precisely the set of events that gave rise to the disputed
orders appealed by the attorneys in several of the cases discussed in
this Comment."
B. Appellate Jurisdiction and Standing Requirements
It is settled law that nonparty attorneys may appeal an order of
monetary sanctions entered against them, as monetary sanctions im-
pose a harm sufficient to grant an attorney standing to bring such an
appeal." On the other hand, attorneys seeking to appeal findings of
professional misconduct must confront a host of complex jurisdiction-
al issues. At the heart of the matter are the standing and reviewability
requirements embodied in Article III of the Constitution 9 and the
traditional maxim that courts review judgments, not opinions."
judgment motion in bad faith or for the purpose of delay); FRCP 83 (allowing district courts to
make rules governing local practice that are not inconsistent with the Rules).
13 FRCP 11(c)(4).
14 FRCP 11, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments.
15 In re Williams, 156 F3d 86,91 (1st Cir 1998).
16 FRCP 11(c)(6).
17 See, for example, In re Williams, 156 F3d at 88-89 (concerning monetary sanctions im-
posed on two nonparty attorneys by a bankruptcy judge who later vacated the sanctions); Sulli-
van v Committee on Admissions and Grievances, 395 F2d 954,956 (DC Cir 1967) (concerning the
charges against an attorney that were dismissed while the district court judge still found that the
attorney violated several ethical rules). See also Bolte v Home Insurance Co, 744 F2d 572, 572
(7th Cir 1984).
18 See note 12.
19 See US Const Art l, § 2.
20 See note 5.
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Article III provides that federal judicial power shall only extend
to various enumerated "cases" and "controversies. '2' The Supreme
Court has held that the "irreducible constitutional minimum of stand-
ing contains three elements": (a) an "injury in fact" that (b) is causally
connected to the defendant's conduct and (c) is likely to be "redressed
by a favorable decision."2 The most relevant requirement for the pur-
poses of this Comment is that an attorney must allege a sufficient "in-
jury in fact" in order to have standing to appeal. The Court has further
specified that the injury must consist of "an invasion of a legally-
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical.' ' ' While the
alleged injury must satisfy all of these conditions, the Court intended
for the "injury in fact" requirement to encompass a broad variety of
economic, aesthetic, and other types of harms."
Since Article III does not actually confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the lower federal courts, ' the constitutional constraints embo-
died in Article III serve as an outer bound for the statutory grants of
jurisdiction that Congress enacts. Federal courts of appeals exercise
their appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1291 et seq,' which
empowers the appellate courts to hear appeals from "all final deci-
sions" of the various federal district courts.
The above background on § 1291 and Article III lays the neces-
sary groundwork for a discussion of the "abecedarian rule that federal
appellate courts review decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees -not
opinions, factual findings, reasoning, or explanations.'' " This rule is in
fact a specific manifestation of the larger doctrine that "[o]rdinarily,
only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may
exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom. ' 29 This rule is most
commonly applied to prevailing parties, who generally are not allowed
to appeal since they have "not [been] aggrieved by the judgment af-
fording the relief. ' Hence, if a party has prevailed on claims provid-
21 US Const Art III, § 2.
22 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-62 (1992) (holding that wildlife
conservation organizations lacked standing to appeal a regulatory agency's interpretation of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973).
23 See id at 560 & n 1 (specifying further that a "particularized" injury "must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way").
24 See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 107 (Aspen 5th ed 2005) (discussing the
historical development and evolution of the injury-in-fact requirement).
25 See US Const Art Il, § 1.
26 See 28 USC § 1291 et seq (2000).
27 See 28 USC § 1291.
28 In re Williams, 156 F2d at 90 (citations omitted).
29 Deposit Guaranty National Bank v Roper, 445 US 326,333 (1980).
30 Id. See also Lindheimer v Illinois Bell Telephone Co, 292 US 151,176 (1934).
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ing the party with the maximum allowable relief, the prevailing party
is typically barred from bringing an appeal no matter how erroneous
the findings of the lower court may be."
Even though courts have interpreted and applied this doctrine as
an aspect of their standing analysis,32 the precise basis for the doctrine
is rather murky. Some courts have contended that the limitations im-
plied by the doctrine are grounded in Article III standing require-
ments. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he rule is
one of federal appellate practice ... derived from the statutes granting
appellate jurisdiction and the historic practices of the appellate courts;
it does not have its source in the jurisdictional limitations of Art. III.""
The resolution of this doctrinal dispute might have real consequences
in that a statutorily based rule may grant courts a greater degree of
latitude to formulate exceptions. Regardless of the confusion regard-
ing the rule's legal basis, the doctrine has "strong policy bases in judi-
cial economy."3
C. Findings of Misconduct in Context: Definitions, Procedural
Posture, and Content
Before addressing the issues at stake in the circuit split, some
background information on the terminology and factual circumstances
dealt with in the cases is required.
This Comment refers to a district court judge's disputed observa-
tions regarding an attorney's behavior as "findings of misconduct."
Typically, the term "findings" is used to denote particular factual de-
terminations made by a judge and is often employed in contradistinc-
tion to other judicial tasks such as applying law to facts or making le-
gal conclusions. More importantly for the purposes of this Comment,
under the "review judgments" rule, findings are distinguished from
judgments and orders, and hence are typically unreviewable." But this
Comment's use of the term "findings of misconduct" is merely a con-
cession to convenience and is not meant to imply that these types of
findings do not qualify as a judgment or order.
31 See, for example, Mathias v WorldCom Technologies, Inc, 535 US 682,684 (2002).
32 See, for example, Asarco, Inc v Secretary of Labor, 206 F3d 720,722 (6th Cir 2000).
33 See, for example, id at 724.
34 Roper, 445 US at 333 (reasoning that since this rule is not constitutionally grounded, a
prevailing party may appeal as long as she retains an interest in appeal satisfying Article III).
35 See Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to
Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 Ga L Rev 813, 886-87 (2004). See also United States
v Accra Pac, 173 F3d 630, 632 (7th Cir 1999) (concluding that the litigant's desire to appeal to
obtain "ammunition for some future dispute ... [or] perhaps psychic gratification" is outweighed
by the costs of the required judicial resources).
36 See notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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This Comment also frequently employs the word "sanction,"
which takes on a highly specialized meaning in this legal context as
well. Given the implications of the "review judgments" rule for appel-
late review,3" it becomes important to determine what exactly qualifies
as a judgment or order. Since the "imposition of a sanction on an at-
torney is universally regarded as an order,"' many attorneys seek to
characterize a judge's harsh words as a judgment in the form of a
sanction. 3 However, the meaning of the word "sanction" is ambiguous
and the subject of much debate in this context. Adding to this confu-
sion, courts have also on occasion utilized the term "reprimand,"
which is functionally indistinguishable from the word "sanction" in
these cases. . Therefore, in order to maintain analytical clarity, this
Comment treats all judicial commentary regarding attorney miscon-
duct as "findings of misconduct" and then discusses whether these
"findings of misconduct" might qualify as a "sanction."
It is also necessary to provide a better picture of the context in
which these kinds of appeals arise by discussing the types of orders for
which attorneys are seeking appellate review. Thus far, all of the cir-
cuits have addressed cases involving findings of misconduct contained
in written orders"1 (rather than an appeal of oral comments made by a
district court judge during the course of a courtroom proceeding). The
written orders appealed are quite diverse in their type and their tim-
ing in the litigation process. Oftentimes, a judge will include findings
of misconduct in an order addressing an adverse party's motion for
sanctions 2 or in an order addressing improprieties raised by the judge
sua sponte."3 Other times, findings of misconduct are included in a
judge's ruling on issues pertaining to the underlying case."
The content of findings of misconduct varies greatly from case to
case. Many judges express their disapproval concisely and often focus
on the attorney's candor or professionalism. One judge concluded that
the attorney "had been less than honest during the settlement pro-
ceeding"" while another determined that the attorneys were guilty of
37 See id.
38 In re Williams, 156 F3d at 90.
39 See, for example, id (arguing that judges' findings qualified as a "de facto sanction").
40 See, for example, Butler, 348 F3d at 1168 ("[An order finding attorney misconduct but not
imposing other sanctions is appealable under § 1291 even if not labeled as a reprimand.").
41 See, for example, In re Williams, 156 F3d at 88-89.
42 See, for example, Butler, 348 F3d at 1165-66.
43 See, for example, Precision Specialty Meta4, Inc v United States, 315 F3d 1346, 1352-53
(Fed Cir 2003).
44 See, for example, Bolte, 744 F2d at 572.
45 Seymour v Hug, 485 F3d 926,927 (7th Cir 2007).
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"blatant misconduct." In several other cases, judges made more spe-
cific determinations that attorneys had violated a particular rule. In
one instance, a court concluded that the attorneys had not complied
with an ethical rule against ex parte contact with represented parties."
Another judge concluded that an attorney's conduct violated Rule 37
since it was "intentional, unprofessional, and unjustified and his shift-
ing the blame to his secretary [was] pure baloney."' One court charac-
terized an attorney's conduct as a "pattern of violations" of several
federal and local rules, which "border[ed] closely on incompetence.' 9
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuits take a number of approaches to answering the ques-
tion of whether a nonparty attorney can appeal an opinion containing
findings of professional misconduct. Their conclusions can be most
simply classified into three basic categories: always appealable, some-
times appealable, and never appealable.
A. Always Appealable
The Fifth, Tenth, and DC Circuits allow attorneys to appeal or-
ders containing findings of misconduct even if they are not labeled as
formal sanctions or associated with monetary sanctions. 0 All three
circuits focus on assessing the attorney's standing under Article III with
each circuit analyzing whether the injury requirement of Article III is
satisfied by the damage that findings of misconduct may inflict on an
attorney's reputation." Since the circuits were "persuaded beyond pe-
radventure that one's professional reputation is a lawyer's most im-
portant and valuable asset,"52 they reasoned that "damage to an attor-
ney's professional reputation is a cognizable and legally sufficient in-
jury."3 Hence, the question becomes which findings do sufficient dam-
46 Walker v City of Mesquite, 129 F3d 831, 832 (5th Cir 1997). See also Weissman v Quail
Lodge Inc, 179 F3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir 1999); Bolte, 744 F2d at 572.
47 See United States v Talao, 222 F3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir 2000).
48 In re Williams, 181 BR 1,4 (Bankr D RI 1995).
49 Biocore Medical Technologies, Inc v Khosrowshahi, 181 FRD 660,674 (D Kan 1998).
50 See Walker v City of Mesquite, 129 F3d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir 1997) (holding that a non-
party attorney may appeal a finding of misconduct because of the potential reputational effects this
might have on the attorney); Butler v Biocore Medical Technologies, Inc, 348 F3d 1163, 1168-69
(10th Cir 2003) (holding that "an order finding attorney misconduct but not imposing other
sanctions is appealable under § 1291 even if not labeled as a reprimand"); Sullivan v Committee
on Admissions and Grievances, 395 F2d 954,956 (DC Cir 1967) (holding that the attorney could
appeal the district court's finding that he had violated various ethics rules even though the dis-
trict court dismissed the charges and did not impose monetary sanctions).
51 See Walker, 129 F3d at 832-33; Butler, 348 F3d at 1168-69; Sullivan, 395 F2d at 956.
52 Walker, 129 F3d at 832.
53 Butler, 348 F3d at 1168.
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age to an attorney's reputation such that the minimum standing re-
quirements are met.
In answering this question, the Fifth, Tenth, and DC Circuits con-
cluded that findings of misconduct cause the requisite amount of
damage." Yet the Tenth Circuit sought to limit this broad rule by hold-
ing, rather ambiguously, that while appellate review is proper for or-
ders finding misconduct, it cannot be extended to encompass "every
negative comment or observation from a judge's pen about an attor-
ney's conduct or performance.""5 Nevertheless, all three circuits agree
that an attorney has standing to appeal regardless of whether the find-
ings of misconduct are actually labeled as a sanction.6
B. Sometimes Appealable
The First and Federal Circuits have adopted an approach that al-
lows attorneys to appeal all orders in which the district court judge has
expressly identified the finding of professional misconduct as a sanc-
tion. The Third Circuit has ruled consistently with this approach but
its narrow opinion avoided having to address the possible distinction
between labeled sanctions and unlabeled findings of misconduct.8 On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the First and Federal Cir-
cuits' position 9 but has developed a slightly more nuanced approach. 6
In justifying their position, the First and Federal Circuits rely
heavily on the rule that "appellate courts sit to review judgments, not
opinions.'"' Applying this rule, these Circuits hold that no matter how
damaging a court's findings may be to the professional reputation of
an attorney, these findings may not be appealed unless they qualify as
SJiudgment, typically in the form of a sanction.u Since these circuits
recognize that nonmonetary sanctions may be appealed,6 the inquiry
54 See id at 1168-69; Walker, 129 F3d at 832-33; Sullivan, 395 F2d at 956.
55 Butler, 348 F3d at 1168.
56 See Walker, 129 F3d at 832-33; Butler, 348 F3d at 1168-69; Sullivan, 395 F2d at 956.
57 See Precision Specialty Metals, Inc v United States, 315 F3d 1346,1352-53 (Fed Cir 2003)
(permitting an appeal of an order in which an attorney was explicitly reprimanded for violating
Rule 11); In re Williams, 156 F3d 86, 92 (1st Cir 1998) (holding that attorneys may only appeal
orders including findings "expressly identified as a reprimand" of the attorney's conduct).
58 See Bowers v National Collegiate Athletic Association, 475 F3d 524, 543-44 (3d Cir 2007)
(allowing appeal of an explicitly labeled public reprimand while reserving judgment on the
propriety of appeals of nonlabeled findings of misconduct).
59 See Weissman v Quail Lodge, Inc, 179 F3d 1194,1200 (9th Cir 1999).
60 See United States v Talao, 222 F3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir 2000) (allowing appeal from an
order including a legal conclusion that a nonparty attorney violated a specific rule of ethical conduct).
61 Sun-Tek Industries, Inc v Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc, 856 F2d 173, 176 (Fed Cir 1988); In re
Williams, 156 F3d at 90.
62 See Precision, 315 F3d at 1352; In re Williams, 156 F3d at 90.
63 See Precision, 315 F3d at 1352-53; In re Williams, 156 F3d at 90.
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shifts to assessing what types of findings may be properly categorized
as sanctions.
In distinguishing between "routine judicial commentary"' and
findings of misconduct that qualify as a sanction, both the First and
Federal Circuits have developed a bright-line rule that an attorney
may only appeal findings of misconduct expressly identified as a sanc-
tion by the presiding judge. In In re Williams,66 the First Circuit re-
jected a looser test that would have allowed certain harshly worded
findings of misconduct to qualify as a "de facto sanction." 67 The court
explained that such a rule would "be almost impossible to cabin" and
any attempt to differentiate "ordinary" from "extraordinary" findings of
misconduct based on degrees of abrasiveness was bound to "proceed on
an ad hoc basis."" The majority similarly rejected as limitless and un-
practical the dissenting judge's approach, which focused on discerning
whether the lower court judge intended the findings to serve as a pu-
nishment.6 Furthermore, employing a vague standard in this context
would in essence "enlist appellate courts to act as some sort of civility
police." The fear of appellate review would have a chilling effect on
judicial candor and would significantly inhibit judges' ability to preside
effectively and efficiently over the litigation process.' Therefore, while
the First Circuit recognized that its test "may be viewed by some as
formalistic," it nonetheless felt that important practical and policy con-
siderations weighed decisively in favor of a bright-line rule.
While the Ninth Circuit in Weissman v Quail Lodge, Inc" adopted
the First and Federal Circuits' approach, it later added a twist to this
rule by treating certain findings of misconduct as a sanction despite
their not being labeled as such." In United States v Talao," the district
court judge determined that an attorney had violated a specific state
rule of ethical conduct." The Ninth Circuit held that a judge's conclu-
64 In re Williams, 156 F3d at 91.
65 See Precision, 315 F3d at 1352-53; In re Williams, 156 F3d at 90.
66 156 F3d 86 (1st Cir 1998).
67 Id at 91.
68 Id.
69 Id at 90-91 n 4 (rejecting this approach as "fraught with peril" since it is always possible
to argue that a judge "intended [to sanction] -or else he would not have been so critical").
70 In re Williams, 156 F3d at 91.
71 See id at 92 (contending that these same concerns motivate the "well-entrenched doc-
trine of absolute judicial immunity from liability for defamation").
72 Idat92n6.
73 179 F3d 1194 (9th Cir 1999).
74 Id at 1200. See also note 59.
75 See Talao, 222 F3d at 1137-38.
76 222 F3d 1133 (9th Cir 2000).
77 See id at 1136.
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sion that a nonparty attorney violated a specific rule of ethical con-
duct is a finding that per se constitutes a reviewable sanction.7 8
C. Never Appealable
The Seventh Circuit remains the only circuit to hold that a nonparty
attorney may never appeal an order where potential damage to profes-
sional reputation is the sole harm. In Bolte v Home Insurance Co,9 the
court held that appellate review under these circumstances would not
fall within the scope of § 1291Y In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ri-
chard Posner focused primarily on the policy implications that such re-
view would engender. He worried that appellate review of findings of
misconduct would presage a "breathtaking expansion in appellate juris-
diction" in that "[lawyers, witnesses, victorious parties, victims, bystand-
ers-all who might be subject to critical comments by a district judge-
[would be able to] appeal their slight if they could show it might lead
to a tangible consequence such as a loss of income."8' Additionally, it
would be extremely difficult to assure a proper adversarial contest of
this type of appeal since no party has a significant interest in having
the findings of misconduct remain in the original opinion? In Judge
Posner's estimation, these factors weighed decisively against appellate
review, especially in "the age of congested appellate dockets." 3 He
explained that the attorney was not entirely without a remedy, noting
that the writ of mandamus" is a more appropriate means of relief.-
Two later Seventh Circuit decisions affirmed the position taken in
Bolte: Clark Equipment Co v Lift Marts Manufacturing Co4 and Sey-
mour v Hug. Importantly, in Seymour, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
its position even though it recomuzed its minority status on this ques-
78 See id at 1138.
79 744 F2d 572 (7th Cir 1984).
80 See id at 573.
81 Id (implying that there would be no way for a court to make a principled distinction
between attorneys and other courtroom participants).
82 See id (detailing how other types of sanctions implicate an opposing party's interest such
that they have a "solid basis for wanting to oppose the appeal").
83 See Bolte, 744 F2d at 573.
84 The writ of mandamus in this context is a writ traditionally used by an appellate court
"to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Roche v Evaporated Milk Association, 319 US
21,26 (1943).
85 See Bolte, 744 F2d at 573. But see Barnhill v United States, 11 F3d 1360, 1371 (7th Cir
1993) (denying nonparty attorneys' writ of mandamus because the attorneys were unable to
allege that the district court's strongly worded findings of fact would result in anything more
than speculative harm to their professional reputations).
86 972 F2d 817,820 (7th Cir 1992).
87 485 F3d 926,929 (7th Cir 2007).
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tion amongst other circuits." The court basically reiterated the previous
arguments made in Bolte and Clark Equipment but also added that the
rule is consistent with the maxim that courts "review... judgments, not
statements in opinions."'"
While most other circuits interpret the Seventh Circuit's opinions
to foreclose appeal of nonmonetary sanctions," the Seventh Circuit
has in fact only expressed this opinion in dicta. The court has never
actually decided a case in which the lower court judge expressly iden-
tified the findings of misconduct as a sanction."
III. ANALYSIS: DECISIONS AND DOCTRINES
In this circuit split, the various circuits take divergent paths as a re-
sult of analyzing the issue of reviewability under different legal frame-
works. The "never appealable" circuit (the Seventh) and "sometimes
appealable" circuits (the First, Third, Ninth, and Federal) concentrate
on applying the traditional rule that appellate courts review judgments,
not opinions. In contrast, the "always appealable" circuits (the Fifth,
Tenth, and DC) focus their inquiry on assessing the attorney's standing
under Article III and ignore the "review judgments" rule.
Having made their choices as to the applicable legal framework,
the circuits must then decide which, if any, findings of misconduct may
be reviewed by an appellate court. For the "sometimes appealable"
and "always appealable" circuits this determination is in large part
dictated by their decisions as to the applicability of the "review judg-
ments" rule. The "sometimes appealable" circuits apply the rule and
hence ask whether the findings of misconduct qualify as a judgment in
the form of a sanction. Conversely, the "always appealable" circuits
inquire whether the injury caused by the findings of misconduct is suffi-
cient to confer standing. On the other hand, the "never appealable"
circuit declines to participate in this debate and instead seems to insist
that findings of misconduct may not be appealed unless they are ac-
companied by monetary liability.
This Part first addresses the applicability of the "review judg-
ments" rule and argues that it must be satisfied in order to appeal
findings of misconduct. This Part then considers and rejects the propo-
sition suggested by the "never appealable" circuit that appellate re-
view must be limited to monetary sanctions.
88 See id at 929.
89 See id.
90 See, for example, Bowers, 475 F3d at 543 ("Only the Seventh Circuit has clearly held
that a public reprimand not accompanied by a monetary sanction is non-appealable.").
91 See Precision, 315 F3d at 1352 (contending that it is not clear that the Seventh Circuit
would deny an appeal to an attorney "actually reprimanded for [ ] misconduct").
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A. The Applicability of the "Review Judgments" Rule to Nonparty
Attorney Appeals of Findings of Misconduct
1. The "always appealable" circuits' approach fails to adequately
address the "review judgments" rule.
In focusing their analysis on the attorney's standing to appeal, the
"always appealable" circuits essentially disregard the potential appli-
cability of the "review judgments" rule. None of the three circuits
mention the distinction between the reviewability of judgments and
findings; instead they concentrate on determining whether the attor-
ney suffered a cognizable injury giving her standing under Article II.9
This injury-based approach significantly affects the way these circuits
determine which type of findings warrant appellate review. Since the
circuits are unconcerned with whether findings of misconduct qualify
as a sanction, the circuits argue that it is nonsensical to allow an attor-
ney to appeal a nominal fine but not a finding of blatant misconduct,
seeing as the latter is much more damaging.3 Additionally, under this
line of analysis the requirement that findings be explicitly labeled as
sanctions is viewed as highly formalistic since it has little to do with
the extent of the harm caused.' Hence, given the "always appealable"
circuits' belief in the importance and fragility of an attorney's reputa-
tion,9' each of these circuits takes an expansive view of the type of
findings that attorneys may appeal.
While the "always appealable" circuits' approach proceeds with a
certain internal logic, these circuits' failure to confront seriously the
"review judgments" maxim in this context is highly problematic. The
"sometimes appealable" circuits argue quite persuasively that findings
of professional misconduct implicate the "review judgments" rule;9
hence, the primary issue is whether the findings of misconduct qualify
as a judgment, not the degree of harm they have caused to the attor-
ney's reputation.9' In light of this view, it is striking that the "always
appealable" circuits do not make any attempt to reconcile their ap-
proach with the requirements of the "review judgments" rule, implicit-
92 See note 50.
93 See Walker v City of Mesquite, 129 F3d 831, 832 (5th Cir 1997) (arguing that it defies
reality to claim that a $100 fine is more damaging than findings of blatant misconduct). See also
Butler v Biocore Medical Technologies; Inc, 348 F3d 1163,1169 (10th Cir 2003).
94 See, for example, id at 1169.
95 See, for example, Walker, 129 F3d at 832 (contending that an attorney's reputation is her
"most important and valuable asset").
96 See In re Williams, 156 F3d 86, 90 (1st Cir 1998); Sun-Tek Industries, Inc v Kennedy Sky
Lites, Inc, 856 F2d 173,176 (Fed Cir 1988).
97 See, for example, In re Williams, 156 F3d at 90-91 (rejecting an attorney's argument that
findings causing sufficient damage should qualify as "de facto sanctions").
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ly assuming that Article III standing is the only relevant issue. This
deficiency leaves these circuits' entire injury-based approach on ques-
tionable grounds.
2. Attempting to reconcile the "always appealable" circuits' ap-
proach with the "review judgments" rule.
To justify their position, the "always appealable" circuits could
have more closely examined the doctrinal basis for the "review judg-
ments" rule. Since the "always appealable" circuits concentrate solely
on demonstrating the attorney's standing under Article III, it becomes
important to ascertain whether the "review judgments" rule is based
in Article III standing requirements or in § 1291 and the historical
practices of the federal courts." If the rule is only a means for assuring
that an appeal is consistent with the constitutional standing doctrine,
then it is possible that an attorney's reputational injury, if sufficient
under Article III, would render the "review judgments" rule super-
fluous under the circumstances. In essence, under this interpretation, a
reputational injury would be distinguishable from the constitutionally
insufficient type of injury that typically underlies an appeal of the
lower court's findings.-
Nevertheless, despite various circuit courts' discussions of Article III
in relation to the "review judgments" rule,"° the maxim is more appro-
priately grounded in nonconstitutional principles. The Supreme Court
explicitly held in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v Roper"' that the rule
"does not have its source in the jurisdictional limitations of Art. III."''
This holding is consistent with the common interpretative practice of
judges reading Article III broadly while interpreting statutes authoriz-
ing appeals more narrowly.'3 Grounding the rule outside of Article
III's "case or controversy" requirement also grants courts greater flex-
ibility in shaping exceptions for certain types of appeals or appel-
lants.' Furthermore, there is nothing in case law discussing Article III
that suggests that any court views Article III as the exclusive basis for
the "review judgments" rule. If the "review judgments" rule is based in
Article III and § 1291, an appellant must allege an injury sufficient to
meet the requirements of both.
98 See notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
99 See United States vAccra Pac, 173 F3d 630,632 (7th Cir 1999).
100 See note 35.
101 445 US 326 (1980).
102 Id at 333-34.
103 See Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators'Association,460 US 37,43 (1983).
104 See Steinman, 38 Ga L Rev at 889 (cited in note 35) (arguing that under this interpretation
courts could decide to accept any nonmoot appeals that do not implicate judicial economy concerns).
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Although a reputational harm adequate under Article III will not
be sufficient to displace a "review judgments" rule grounded in § 1291
and historical practices, this looser statutory basis for the rule does
open the door for a number of potential exceptions. While there are
potentially four different exceptions to the "review judgments" rule,
5
only the exception articulated in Electrical Fittings Corp v Thomas &
Betts Co'° is potentially relevant to the issue at hand.'° The Supreme
Court carved out this narrow exception allowing an appellate court to
eliminate, but not to review, an adverse collateral ruling from the dis-
trict court's decree as long as the appellant retained a stake in the liti-
gation satisfying the requirements of Article 111.'0' At first glance, this
type of appeal in some ways resembles appeals of findings of miscon-
duct in that attorneys often only seek vacatur or expungement of the
contested findings and allege a reputational injury that might be suffi-
cient under Article III. Nevertheless, any superficial similarity is
proved irrelevant since the Court limited appellate review to collater-
al adjudication of "one of the issues litigated."' Given that findings of
misconduct involving nonparty attorneys do not qualify as a ruling on
one of the issues litigated in the underlying case, the Electrical Fittings
110
exception is not applicable in this context.
Attempting to fill the gap left in the "always appealable" circuits'
analysis by looking deeper into the applicability of the "review judg-
ments" rule reveals that the rule is ultimately irreconcilable with these
circuits' approach. Since these circuits' injury-based approach is justi-
fied solely as a means for assessing standing under Article III, it is ill
fit for analysis of appealability under the "review judgments" rule.
105 See id at 890-911 (discussing four different types of exceptions: orders dismissed without
prejudice, orders that have a collateral estoppel effect, orders having an "adverse practical con-
sequence," and orders rendered in violation of Article III).
106 307 US 241 (1939).
107 Appeals of findings of misconduct do not involve orders that have been dismissed with
prejudice. The findings also will not have any estoppel effect in any future litigation involving the
nonparty attorney. Finally, none of the attorneys alleged that the findings were rendered in viola-
tion of the district court's powers under Article III.
108 See Electrical Fittings, 307 US at 242 (1939). In Electrical Fittings, the district court had
ruled that the plaintiffs patent was valid but ultimately held that the defendant had not in-
fringed on the patent and therefore dismissed the complaint. See id at 241-42. Addressing the
defendant's attempt to appeal the patent validity ruling, the Court held that the court of appeals
had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal but only so far as it sought to reform the decree (elimi-
nating the validity ruling) and avoided reviewing the merits. See id at 242. Crucially, the Court
permitted a limited appeal despite its acknowledgment that the validity determination would not
have any binding effect in subsequent litigation. See id.
109 See id at 242.
110 Furthermore, the exception could be read narrowly only to apply to appeals of proce-
dural decisions and findings of misconduct that do not involve procedural decisions.
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B. The Reviewability of Judgments in the Form of Nonmonetary
Sanctions under the "Review Judgments" Rule
Since the "imposition of a sanction on an attorney is universally
regarded as an order,""' it seems natural at this stage to begin to ex-
plore which findings of misconduct qualify as a sanction. But, it is first
necessary to justify the "sometimes appealable" circuits' implicit as-
sumption that nonmonetary sanctions are reviewable. This assumption
is potentially called into question by a literal reading of the "never
appealable" circuit's holdings.
1. The "never appealable" circuit's approach to
nonmonetary sanctions.
Several courts have interpreted the "never appealable" circuit's
line of cases to prevent appeal of any sanction that is unaccompanied
by monetary liability."' Assuming for the moment that this rule is part
of the circuit's holdings and not merely dicta,"' one can find support
for this approach in the reasoning employed in Bolte. In that case,
Judge Posner argued generally against expanding appellate jurisdic-
tion, but he also included analysis that more specifically supported
limiting appeals to sanctions coupled with monetary consequences."'
He contended that the monetary aspect of a sanction ensured that
"whoever received the benefit of the sanction [would] ha[ve] a solid
basis for wanting to oppose the appeal.." Judge Posner posited that,
in the absence of this incentive, it would be difficult to ensure an ad-
versarial appeal of nonmonetary sanctions."6 The opinion also briefly
mentioned a series of cases indirectly supporting this concern with
nonmonetary sanctions. "7 In these cases, appellate review was denied
to parties who had been adjudicated in contempt or in violation of an
injunction but had not suffered any other penalties."' Yet although the
111 In re Williams, 156 F3d at 90.
112 See, for example, Butler, 348 F3d at 1167 (classifying the Seventh Circuit as the only circuit
that never permits appeal in the absence of monetary sanctions).
113 See Precision Specialty Metals, Inc v United States, 315 F3d 1346, 1352 (Fed Cir 2003)
(contending that it is not clear that the Seventh Circuit would deny appeal to an attorney "ac-
tually reprimanded for [ I misconduct").
114 See Bolte, 744 F2d at 573 (7th Cir 1984).
115 Id.
116 See id.
117 See id, citing United States Steel Corp v Fraternal Association of Steel Haulers, 601 F2d
1269, 1273 (3d Cir 1979); Major v Orthopedic Equipment Co, 561 F2d 1112, 1115 (4th Cir 1977);
Rosenfeldt v Comprehensive Accounting Service Corp, 514 F2d 607, 611 (7th Cir 1975); River
Valley, Inc v Dubuque County, 507 F2d 582,584-85 (8th Cir 1974) (per curiam).
118 See United States Steel, 601 F2d at 1273 (holding that a party found in civil contempt
may only appeal once the court has sought to punish or coerce compliance); Major, 561 F2d at
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court in Bolte did not expressly hold that nonmonetary sanctions were
unreviewable, 9 subsequent "never appealable" circuit cases cite Bolte
in explicitly stating that appellate review is limited to "situations in-
volving monetary sanction only.' '
Given that Judge Posner did not directly address the issue of
nonmonetary sanctions in Bolte, it is possible to expand upon his rea-
soning for additional support of the view that only monetary sanctions
are reviewable. He was hinting at an important intuition by citing a
series of cases in which courts denied appeals to parties seeking to
challenge orders without any binding effect.12 ' By doing so, he seemed
to acknowledge implicitly the importance of a judgment's binding na-
ture to the availability of appellate review. In one of these cited cases,
the Third Circuit emphasized this idea of bindedness in the context of
civil contempt, explaining that "until a sentence or sanction has been
imposed 'the situation is lacking in the elements of operativeness and
consequence necessary to be possessed by any judicial order to enable
it to have the status of a final decision under § 1291....2 Obviously
Judge Posner had not forgotten about the reputational harm the at-
torney allegedly suffered;1 23 rather he was articulating the fact that the
findings had no binding effect on the rights or obligations of the at-
torney. In much the same way, even findings of misconduct qualifying
as a judgment in the form of a sanction would not have any binding
effect. The importance of a judgment's binding nature to the availabil-
ity of appellate review is further supported by the cases Judge Posner
cited in Bolte, all of which denied appeal to parties seeking to chal-
lenge orders without any binding effect. '
An attempt to link appellate review to some form of binding
judgment might serve as a way to prevent the "review judgments" rule
from devolving into a type of empty formalism. Under the "sometimes
appealable" circuits' approach, there is very little substantive difference
between unreviewable findings of misconduct and reviewable nonmo-
netary sanction judgments other than the latter being labeled as a
1115 (holding that a finding of noncompliance with an injunction is not reviewable unless ac-
companied by a sanction or some further court action on the issue); Rosenfeldt, 514 F2d at 611
(denying an appeal of a finding of contempt that was no longer accompanied by a jail sentence
or fine); River Valley, 507 F2d at 584-85 (denying as premature an appeal from a district court's
order for appellant to show cause as to why he should not be held in contempt).
119 See 744 F2d at 573 (addressing findings that were not labeled as a sanction and holding
these type of findings did not qualify as an appealable "final decision" under § 1291).
120 Seymour v Hug, 485 F3d 926, 929 (7th Cir 2007). See also Clark Equipment v Lift Parts
Manufacturing Co, 972 F2d 817,820 (7th Cir 1992).
121 See Bolte, 744 F2d at 573.
122 United States Steel, 601 F2d at 1273, quoting SEC v Naftalin, 460 F2d 471,475 (8th Cir 1972).
123 See Bolte, 744 F2d at 572-73.
124 See note 118.
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sanction. This similarity would seem to violate the animating idea be-
hind the "review judgments" rule that something significant distin-
guishes judgments from findings such that appellate review is only
appropriate for the former. Hence, applying the "review judgments"
rule in this context would be a highly formalistic exercise. In contrast,
a simple, bright-line rule that denied appellate review to nonmonetary
sanctions would uphold the integrity of the "review judgments" rule.
2. A literal interpretation of the "never appealable" circuit's
cases results in an overly narrow approach.
In order to refute a strict reading of the "never appealable" cir-
cuit's approach, it is necessary to move past the "sometimes appeala-
ble" circuits' conclusory rejection of this position.'2 In attempting to
formulate a more nuanced rebuttal, it is necessary first to address how
denying appellate review to nonmonetary sanctions is inconsistent
with the mandates of Rule 11. Not only does Rule 11 explicitly permit
nonmonetary sanctions, ' but it also requires all sanctions to be ac-
companied by an order "describ[ing] the sanctioned conduct and ex-
plain[ing] the basis for the sanction. 12. Since the purpose behind this
requirement is presumably in part to facilitate appellate review, it
would be odd and wasteful to extend this requirement to nonmoneta-
ry sanctions if these types of sanctions were unreviewable.n
Also, it appears upon closer examination that the policy ratio-
nales Judge Posner advances in Bolte only weakly support this narrow
view of reviewability. The generic concern about congested appellate
dockets is more relevant to refuting the "always appealable" circuits'
expansive position as opposed to the "sometimes appealable" circuits'
more focused approach, which significantly limits the number of ap-
peals by requiring findings to be explicitly labeled as a sanction!"
Judge Posner's unease with one-sided presentations of appeals in this
context is also overblown. This difficulty has seemingly been over-
come in appeals of sanctions with fines payable to the court, a type of
125 See, for example, Bowers v National Collegiate Athletic Association, 475 F3d 524,543 (3d
Cir 2007) (discounting the "never appealable" circuit's approach as inconsistent with the majori-
ty authority on this issue).
126 See note 13 and accompanying text.
127 FRCP 11(c)(6).
128 This seems particularly strange since the Rules added additional requirements for mone-
tary sanctions in Rule 11(c)(5) yet clearly neglected to distinguish between monetary and non-
monetary sanctions in Rule 11(c)(6).
129 See, for example, Precision, 315 F3d at 1352-53. Limiting appeal to explicitly labeled
sanctions will also significantly limit the concern about the "breathtaking expansion" of appel-
late review to remarks made about nonattorneys.
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appeal presumably consistent with the "never appealable" circuit's
requirement of monetary liability.nO
Furthermore, the cases that Judge Posner cites in Bolte are not, as
he admits, directly on point.. and in fact do not support a broad read-
ing of the holding in Bolte limiting appeals to monetary sanctions.
These cases are much better categorized as concerning the appealabil-
ity and hence the proper timing of appeal as opposed to the issue of
reviewability of orders without any binding effect."' The courts in
these cases emphasized that some further penalizing action had to be
taken, either on behalf of the parties or the lower court, to make the
contested order an appealable "final decision" under § 1291.33 Particu-
larly in the context of cases dealing with civil contempt, the courts
clearly did not interpret a finding of contempt as the actual or in-
tended sanction... but rather anticipated the imposition of a jail sen-
tence or fine."' In contrast, a nonmonetary sanction is the final action
of a district court on the issue of attorney misconduct and the repri-
mand by itself serves as the sanction.
The contention that the "review judgments" rule is rendered for-
malistic if used to justify the reviewability of nonmonetary sanctions is
also ultimately unconvincing, as it fails to recognize the differences
between findings and sanctions. While findings of misconduct may on
occasion contain harsh criticisms similar to those included in sanction
orders, judges will often choose to label findings of misconduct as
sanctions in only the most egregious of cases.' Additionally, a more
flexible approach to defining sanctions that does not rely solely on the
explicit labeling of sanctions would help minimize the sense of empty
formalism. The Ninth Circuit's approach, which allows appeal when a
judge finds that an attorney violated a specific rule, would do a great
deal to help recognize those types of findings of misconduct that are
particularly damaging to an attorney's reputation and hence would
diminish the impression that the distinction between findings and
sanctions rests on formalistic rules. Moreover, a rule requiring the
judgment to have a binding effect would seemingly run into similar
130 See David Scharf, The Settled Sanction: Post-settlement Appeal and Vacatur of Attorney
Sanctions Payable to an Opponent, 61 U Chi L Rev 1627, 1641 (1994) (arguing in a related con-
text that lack of adversarial appeals should not be determinative on the issue of reviewability).
131 See Bolte, 744 F2d at 573 ("We cannot find a case directly on point.").
132 See notes 27-28.
133 See, for example, United States Steel, 601 F2d at 1273.
134 See, for example, Rosenfeldt, 514 F2d at 611.
135 See, for example, United States Steel, 601 F2d at 1273.
136 It is also likely that a judge's decision to render her findings of misconduct in the form of
a highly formalized sanction will in most cases add substantially to the reputational harm suf-
fered by the attorney as it will serve as a clear indication of the judge's disapproval.
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problems since appealing the imposition of a nominal monetary fine
would have to be deemed more compelling than an appeal of a non-
monetary sanction for unethical conduct. "' Since both rules can at
times appear formalistic, it would be preferable to have a bright-line
rule that extended appellate review to nonmonetary sanctions given
the potentially significant reputational harm at stake.
The "never appealable" circuit's line of cases is therefore best
read more narrowly as having only held that an attorney is limited to
appealing findings of misconduct that qualify as a sanction. Since the
"never appealable" circuit has not yet directly confronted an order
explicitly labeling findings as a sanction, it is entirely reasonable to
interpret the circuit's assertions regarding the reviewability of non-
monetary sanctions as dicta."' This interpretation would enable the
"never appealable" circuit's cases to coexist consistently with the
more defensible approach to nonmonetary sanctions adopted by the
"sometimes appealable" circuits.
IV. THE SOLUTION: ADOPTING THE FORMALITY/HARM APPROACH
In attempting to determine which findings qualify for appellate
review under the "review judgments" rule, this Part builds upon the
Ninth Circuit's solution to the circuit split and proposes a new test: the
formality/harm approach. The problem that this solution attempts to
resolve is a narrow one: how best to define which findings qualify as
sanctions. First, this Part sketches out the difficulties encountered in
attempting to define the term "sanction." Then, it rejects as too broad
and too narrow two polar opposite approaches developed by judges in
the courts of appeals addressing this issue. This Part then introduces
the more successful Ninth Circuit's approach, which allows appeal of
certain unlabeled sanctions. Yet this approach is also deficient in some
ways, leading to the proposed formality/harm approach. This solution
is supported by its consistency with the Ninth Circuit's definition of
sanctions and its ability to provide needed appellate review to an ad-
ditional set of findings.
A. Defining "Sanction": A Deceptively Difficult Task
The task of defining "sanction" is far from easy. Black's Law Dic-
tionary defines a sanction as a "penalty or coercive measure that re-
sults from failure to comply with a law, rule, or order.' 39 Yet this gen-
137 See Walker, 129 F3d 831, 832 (5th Cir 1997).
138 See notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
139 Black's Law Dictionary 1368 (West 8th ed 2004).
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eral and broad definition of a sanction is of little use when attempting
to draw a line between findings of misconduct and sanctions.
Developing a workable definition of a sanction does not become
any easier when one looks to other possible sources of meaning. When
a judge imposes sanctions pursuant to her inherent power, the defini-
tion of sanction is even less clear because the court does not act pur-
suant to a guiding legislative definition of sanctions to apply.1" The
multiple references to the term "sanction" contained in the Rules pro-
vide little assistance in discerning a meaningful definition of a sanction.
While the Rules make it clear that sanctions can include nonmonetary
directives,"I they do not supply a clear definition, only briefly suggest-
ing that nonmonetary sanctions may consist of "an admonition, repri-
mand, or censure..... In the absence of any clear definition, courts have
struggled to distinguish findings of misconduct from sanctions and
have often justified their approach by relying on policy analysis.
B. Polar Opposite Approaches to Defining "Sanction"
The "sometimes appealable" circuits are the only circuits to have
specified which findings of misconduct qualify as a sanction. These
circuits have formulated two significantly different approaches, one
endorsed by the First and Federal Circuits and the other developed in
a dissenting opinion. Excluding for the moment the Ninth Circuit, the
First and Federal Circuits have adopted a narrow bright-line test re-
quiring that findings be expressly identified as a sanction."3 On the
other end of the spectrum exists an intent-based test that proceeds on a
case-by-case basis. This test, developed in Judge Max Rosenn's dissent
in In re Williams, focuses on determining the judge's intended purpose
in making the contested findings.'" Under the test, appellate review
would be extended to findings intended to punish but would be denied
140 See notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
141 See FRCP 11(c)(4).
142 FRCP 11, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments. These terms are highly
ambiguous. "Reprimand" is defined as "a form of disciplinary action-imposed after trial or
formal charges-that declares the lawyer's conduct improper but does not limit his or her right
to practice law; a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to
practice law." Black's Law Dictionary 1329 (cited in note 139). "Censure" is defined as an "offi-
cial reprimand or condemnation; harsh criticism." Id at 237. "Admonition" is defined as a "repri-
mand or cautionary statement addressed to counsel by a judge." Id at 52.
143 See Precision Specialty Metas, Inc v United States, 315 F3d 1346, 1352-53 (Fed Cir 2003);
In re Williams, 156 F3d at 92.
144 See In re Williams, 156 F3d at 98 (Rosenn dissenting).
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whenever the judge's intention was to stop misconduct or "control less
offensive attorney misbehavior" such as cumulative questioning.'5
The vast differences between these opposing approaches illu-
strate the shortcomings of each of the definitions proposed. The in-
tent-based test is ad hoc and overinclusive. It is difficult to develop a
clear and principled test that rests completely on discerning the dis-
trict court judge's intent or identifying particularly damaging find-
ings."6 Given the uncertainty surrounding this test and the breadth of
findings it may potentially cover, there is also a significant concern
that the rule would chill candid speech by lower court judges.",
The First and Federal Circuits' bright-line test is certainly easier
to administer, but this virtue also begets predictable weaknesses. The
test's reliance on labeling is highly formalistic and completely ignores
the substantive content of the findings."' Also, by allowing a district
court judge to decide whether to label her findings as a sanction, this
approach gives the judge the power to determine if her decision will
be subject to appellate review.49 Granting district court judges this
authority seems particularly problematic in this context since harshly
worded findings of misconduct are often made in a heated litigation
environment. Therefore, it might be especially useful to have the find-
ings reviewed by a disinterested appellate court far removed from this
heavily charged atmosphere.
By tying appellate review completely to labels, the bright-line ap-
proach ensures that some findings that cause substantial reputational
damage will escape appeal. While a judge's decision to sanction expli-
citly an attorney likely carries significant weight, in many situations a
judge will do equivalent or greater damage by concluding that an at-
torney took part in highly dishonest or unprofessional conduct. Hence,
the First and Federal Circuits' bright-line approach is considerably
145 See id (arguing that this test would enable the district court to "retain the power to
comment, sternly when necessary, on a lawyer's performance").
146 See id at 91 (majority) (noting the difficulty of assessing subjective intent in this heated
context). Additionally, the absence of such a rule will likely lead to a significant rise in litigation.
See id. This is particularly troublesome considering that appellate dockets are already congested.
147 This chilling effect will operate to restrict judicial commentary due to judges' desire not
to be overturned on appeal. This desire might be particularly strong in this context since judges
likely loathe to have their findings overturned on appeal when they believe the attorney has
engaged in egregious misconduct and displayed a disrespect towards the adverse party and the
judge. Compare Clark Equipment Co v Lift Parts Manufacturing, 1987 WL 19150, *1 (ND Ill)
(describing that the court was "shocked by the [attorneys'] conduct," which included "attempted
frustration of the court's jurisdictional power" and "deliberate disobedience of court orders").
148 See In re Williams, 156 F3d at 97 (Rosenn dissenting) (arguing that it makes little sense
to allow an attorney to appeal a nominal fine while denying the appeal of highly damaging find-
ings of misconduct).
149 See id at 99.
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underinclusive, leaving many attorneys significantly harmed and with-
out recourse.
C. A Step in the Right Direction: The Ninth Circuit Approach
The Ninth Circuit has managed to forge a middle ground in be-
tween these unsatisfying approaches. While the Ninth Circuit allows
appeal of findings expressly labeled as sanctions, ' it has supplemented
this approach with an additional rule that expands the universe of
findings subject to appeal."' The Ninth Circuit's standard permits an
attorney to appeal an order that finds that the attorney violated a spe-
cific rule.'52 These types of findings of misconduct are said to constitute
a per se sanction."'
In assessing whether these findings of misconduct qualified as a
sanction, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the essential features of a sanc-
tion were its degree of formality and its effect on the party repri-
manded.'" A finding of a specific rule violation is much more formal
than a judge's general expression of disapproval. This type of finding
of misconduct also has much the same effect as an explicitly labeled
sanction since the finding of misconduct will damage the attorney's
reputation and possibly subject her to disciplinary action at the state
bar. Furthermore, a rule recognizing these types of findings as sanc-
tions would not undermine the policy considerations that the First
Circuit felt weighed in favor of a strict bright-line rule.16 Such a rule
would not engender any significant line-drawing problems, as it clearly
delineates the narrow set of findings subject to appellate review. The
rule therefore would not chill judicial frankness since judges would
not be operating under uncertain reviewability standards.
Even though this rule helps extend appellate review to many ag-
grieved attorneys, it falls short under many circumstances. Just as it
was easy for a judge to evade appellate review under an explicit labe-
ling approach, it would be similarly easy for a judge to avoid making
findings of specific rule violations. For example, a judge could instead
issue an opinion containing findings of misconduct that either detailed
the conduct that violated the rule or expressed her disapproval in
more general terms. In either case, the attorney would again be left
without any access to appellate review.
150 See Weissman, 179 F3d at 1200.
151 See Talao, 222 F3d at 1137-38 (9th Cir 2000).
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See id at 1138.
155 See Talao, 222 F3d at 1138.
156 See notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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D. Solving the Circuit Split: A Formality/Harm Approach
Despite the limitations of the Ninth Circuit's test, it is possible to
avoid the pitfalls of this approach while building on its basic frame-
work. A key to expanding upon the Ninth Circuit approach is to ap-
preciate its crucial insight into the importance of formality and harm.
But, analysis of these characteristics need not be limited solely to the
content of the findings. Instead, an appellate court should look for
these two integral characteristics in both the specific wording of the
findings and the context in which they were made.
1. A new set of per se sanctions.
Looking at the context in which courts make findings of miscon-
duct reveals a set of circumstances that provide a natural springboard
for modifying the Ninth Circuit approach. The question of reviewabili-
ty of findings commonly arises in situations where the district court's
original imposition of sanctions is overruled on a motion for reconsi-
deration or on appeal.' In these cases, the impact of the district or
appellate court's decision is typically limited to the sanction judgment
and therefore the original district court opinion is often left unaltered
and available to the public. In many cases, the judge subsequently de-
clines to vacate the original opinion.'m To the dismay of the attorney
involved, these opinions typically contain detailed and strongly worded
findings of misconduct, " 9 which were originally employed to support
the imposition of monetary sanctions.
Echoing the Ninth Circuit approach, findings made originally in
support of later-overturned sanctions should qualify as per se sanc-
tions and therefore be subject to appellate review. This approach ex-
tends the reach of the Ninth Circuit test while respecting its emphasis
on formality and harm.
2. Applying the contextualized formality/harm approach.
The requisite formality of findings of misconduct is apparent
from examining their content and the context in which they are made.
Under the circumstances described above -situations where the dis-
trict court's original imposition of sanctions is overruled on a motion
for reconsideration or on appeal-a judge made the findings with the
157 See note 17.
158 See In re Williams, 156 F3d at 88-89; Bolte, 744 F2d at 572.
159 See, for example, In re Williams, 156 F3d at 88 (describing the attorneys' conduct as
"obstructionist and unjustified"); Bolte, 744 F2d at 572 (finding that the attorney's conduct was
"reprehensible"); Sullivan, 395 F2d at 956 (describing the attorney's violation of five different
canons of ethics).
1880 [75:1857
Reviewability of Findings of Misconduct
deliberate intention of specifying the precise misconduct she original-
ly concluded warranted sanctioning. Hence, these findings of miscon-
duct, made for a particular, narrow purpose, are similar to findings of a
specific rule violation, which indicates that the court is not just "gen-
erally expressing its disapproval of a lawyer's behavior. ' .. Additional-
ly, these findings are made within the very formal context of explicitly
imposing sanctions. Often, sanctions are imposed only after a formal
hearing takes place.", Then when the original sanctions are later over-
turned, the district court judge frequently makes an explicit choice not
to vacate the findings."' Therefore, it appears that such findings have
formal qualities and "bear[] a greater resemblance to a reprimand than
to a comment merely critical of inappropriate attorney behavior."
' 1
The harm that this type of finding can inflict on an attorney's
reputation is of a similar magnitude to that caused by findings of a
specific rule violation. Since the district court judge takes the drastic
step of imposing sanctions, it is likely that the misconduct described in
the order is very severe. ' The finding supporting the imposition of a
sanction will also likely be lengthy and detailed since the district court
judge will anticipate appellate review and will seek to create a record
to justify her choice of sanctions. These considerations weigh heavily
in favor of the conclusion that such findings of misconduct may se-
verely damage an attorney's reputation.
It might be contended, however, that findings of specific rule viola-
tions are distinguishable from those made in support of later-overturned
sanctions, since the latter were clearly not intended to serve as a sanc-
tion given that the judge imposed other sanctions. First, this conten-
tion ignores the possibility that the original sanction was not the only
intended sanction. it is possible that the findings serve a dual purpose:
supporting the explicit sanction while themselves serving as a detailed
public reprimand. Even if this possibility is rejected, the objection fails
to examine the situation from the correct temporal perspective. While
160 Talao, 222 F3d at 1138.
161 See, for example, FRCP 11. Unfortunately, this approach does very little to help with the
most egregious abuse of a district court's sanctioning power: criticizing the attorney without
labeling it as a sanction and not affording the attorney due process to appeal this sanction.
162 See, for example, Bolte, 744 F2d at 572 (explaining that the judge declined to dismiss his
determination of misconduct even though the parties settled and that the case itself was dismissed).
163 Talao, 222 F3d at 1138.
164 While an attorney will have been vindicated to some extent by the withdrawal of the
original sanction, this decision likely only reflects the judgment that the particular type of sanc-
tion imposed was not justified. In fact, it is entirely possible that the sanctions were thrown out
on the basis of some procedural defect that had nothing to do with the substantive merits of the
original sanction decision.
165 Compare Weissman, 179 F3d at 1200 (explaining that the findings themselves were not
intended as a sanction, rather they were only meant to support a different sanction).
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the findings may serve merely as support when the original sanction
was imposed, it is clear that after the sanction is overturned, the findings
can no longer serve this same supportive purpose. Hence, the analysis
should focus instead on the time at which the judge refused to vacate
the findings. At this point in time, it is fair to infer that the judge in-
tended to impose a type of sanction in the form of a public reprimand.'6'
3. Policy rationales supporting the adoption of the
formality/harm approach.
In much the same manner as the Ninth Circuit test, the formali-
ty/harm approach will achieve the policy oriented goals attained by
the First and Federal Circuits' bright-line test. This approach will ap-
ply in a set of well-defined circumstances and thus retain much of the
clarity of a bright-line rule. Also, the rule will apply only to findings
that the judge originally anticipated would be reviewed, such as those
in support of monetary sanctions; hence judicial candor will not likely
be influenced by the possibility of appellate review under this mod-
ified approach. In addition, the detailed set of findings made in sup-
port of the original sanctions will further help mitigate the difficulty of
a one-sided appeal process. Furthermore, there is little concern that
the rule will presage a "breathtaking expansion in appellate litigation"
since it is naturally limited by the number of sanctions overturned on
167
reconsideration or appeal.
Another important advantage of the formality/harm approach is
that it helps to minimize the potential for opportunistic behavior by
district court judges. A judge only makes two decisions relevant to the
applicability of the formality/harm approach: the decision regarding
the imposition of the original sanction and the decision concerning
vacatur of the findings. The latter decision is not particularly important
because at that stage the judge must either accept appellate review or
rule favorably for the attorney. In regards to the former decision, it
seems much less likely that this decision will be significantly influenced
by the possibility of future appellate review of findings than the deci-
sion whether to include a finding of a specific rule violation.'
166 See Bolte, 744 F2d at 573. In this sense, the formality/harm approach can also be viewed
as in some sense fulfilling the goals of a more intent-based approach. See notes 144-43 and
accompanying text.
167 In this regard it is also important that these cases involved conduct originally thought
serious enough to merit sanctions. This judgment will likely serve a filtering function that will
help ensure that additional cases brought under this rule will involve findings of misconduct
significantly damaging to an attorney's reputation.
168 See Part IVC.
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The reduction of opportunistic judicial behavior is particularly
important at the stage where the judge decides whether to vacate the
findings. At this juncture, choosing not to vacate- and hence avoiding
appellate review-might be especially appealing, convenient, and
harmful. In any of these cases, the district court judge clearly thought
the misconduct sufficiently egregious to warrant sanctions and likely
developed strong feelings during what was presumably a very heated
and contentious litigation environment. If the sanctions are later over-
turned by an appellate court, the district court judge might very well
be dissatisfied with the outcome and concerned that the attorney will
not be properly punished. At this point, denying the attorney's motion
to vacate the opinion might seem very attractive. The opinion will
serve as a form of public reprimand and will conveniently not be sub-
ject to appellate review. This seems particularly worrisome since an
appellate court would have already ruled that the findings did not
support the imposition of the original sanctions, therefore leaving it
unclear as to whether any other punishment would be justified. The
formality/harm approach would eliminate this troubling possibility.
Lastly, the inherent flexibility of the formality/harm approach
points to the possibility that courts may in the future employ the rule
to adopt more categories of per se sanctions. The Ninth Circuit and
this Comment have merely identified two sets of findings that have
the requisite formality and cause sufficient harm to qualify as per se
sanctions. In the tradition of the common law, courts could hopefully
build upon these two categories and react to changing circumstances
by introducing and adopting new categories of sanctions slowly over
time. In order to maintain a meaningful distinction from the "always
appealable" circuits' approach, these courts should not only stringently
apply the formality and harm requirements but should also pay close
attention to the policy considerations outlined in support of the per se
sanctions advocated in this Comment. If this approach is faithfully
adopted, it would do much to introduce a greater degree of rationality
and transparency to the hazy world of nonmonetary sanctions and
would likely lead to a more balanced approach to appellate review.
CONCLUSION
Having resolved the doctrinal confusion regarding the applicabil-
ity of the "review judgments" rule and the reviewability of nonmone-
tary sanctions, it is clear that the task at hand is to define correctly
which findings of misconduct qualify as sanctions. The adoption of the
formality/harm approach solves this difficult question in a manner
that is both doctrinally sound and justified on policy grounds. By
avoiding the pitfalls of more extreme approaches, this Comment's
proposal is able to build successfully on the Ninth Circuit's test in or-
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der to achieve a more balanced solution. The proposed approach
would treat all findings originally made in support of later-overturned
sanctions as per se sanctions. This approach pays close attention to the
two essential characteristics of sanctions: their formality and the de-
gree of harm they cause. It is therefore able to remain true to the un-
derlying logic of the Ninth Circuit test while also achieving some of
the goals of a looser intent-based test. The parameters of the rule are
clearly defined, which makes the rule simple to implement and its ap-
plication easy to predict. More so than any alternative, the test sub-
stantially reduces the ability of district court judges to act opportunis-
tically to avoid appellate review. Additionally, the formality/harm ap-
proach provides a guiding principle for courts in the future to expand
the reach of appellate review further in this context by recognizing
other categories of per se sanctions.
